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COMMON LAW RESTRICTIONS ON  COMMERCIAL AND
POLITICAL USER OF THE HIGHWAY.
The purpose of this article is to examine the uses which the citizen is entitled to
make of the public highway.  This is an issue of constitutional and cultural
significance in a system in which all land is privately owned,1 for public space
becomes the arena in which much social, political and commercial activity
takes place. Highways are an important public resource offering opportunities
not only for travel, but also social interaction, recreation, commerce, and, of
course, protest.  A walk though a small English town on a summer's afternoon
revealed that, in addition to uses connected with the right of free passage,
highways in the town were used for the stationing of boards advertising menus
at pubs and restaurants; the  distribution of leaflets; and the collection funds for
charity. A trader operated  a burger stand;  conversations took place between
passers-by;   rubbish bins and skips were placed on the highway; cars and heavy
goods vehicles were parked on the road-side; and there were buskers, and stalls
for street sellers;  some shops even displayed goods on the pavement.   The law
has struggled to accommodate these and many other  familiar uses of the
highway within the legal principles governing their use.
This indeterminacy has partly been attributable to a failure to identify an
appropriate theoretical model. The law has shifted between two alternative
approaches.  According to the first "private law" approach the user of the
highway has to demonstrate that he or she is in some private law sense a
member of a class of persons which is  the beneficiary of a legal right to use the
highway. The intention, or presumed intention of the landowner, who first
dedicated to way to public use is relevant here.
A different model, which is the antithesis of the private law model, is founded
upon communitarian principles.  This prefers to ask whether the use in question
is reasonable regardless of the intention of the private landowner who first
dedicated the highway to public use. This model is, in one sense, a means of
facilitating individual freedom, although it also overrides  it since the interest of
the  landowner is subordinate.  This latter approach is ultimately concerned
with whether there is a need to regulate the activity rather than with the private
law  origin of the public's right of access.   This failure to resolve the
fundamental questions of principle has  produced divergences  within even the
most recent decisions, as will be shown in relation to Secretary of State for
Defence v. Percy, 2   and  the   House of Lords' decision in  DPP v. Jones.3  This
                                                          
1  The problems of the reconciling the interests of the community with the interests of private
landowners is raised in the proposed introduction of a "right to roam"  announced in The Times, March
9th 1999.  Legislation is not expected before 2001.
2  [1999] 1 All ER 732, Carnwath J.
2article will evaluate these models in order to identify the  extent to which the
common law accommodates  economic and political activity  in respect of the
highway.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A HIGHWAY?
At common law, a highway is a way over which there exists a public right of
passage.  This right is one which allows "all of Her Majesty's subjects at all
seasons of the year freely and at their  will to pass and repass without let or
hindrance".4   The highway may be dedicated subject to   conditions, for
example, as to the class of traffic which may use it.
The definition is wide enough to include inter alia footpaths,5 lay-bys,6   
"service roads",7    a pedestrian precinct,8  bridleways 9  and grass verges,10
depending on the facts.
For the purposes of the Highways Act 1980, s.328 extends the meaning of
"highway" to the whole or part of a highway other than a ferry or waterway.
Where a highway passes over a bridge or through a tunnel these are also taken,
for the purposes of the Act, to be a part of the highway.
THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC IN RELATION TO THE HIGHWAY
The Private Law  Model
 The private law   asks whether the user in question falls within those classes of
user which the landowner contemplated, or can be presumed to have
contemplated, when the highway was first dedicated to the public. It purports to
respect individual preferences by identifying the scope of the grant of property
                                                                                                                                                                     
3  [1999]  2 WLR 625.
4  Ex p. Lewis (1888) 21 QBD 191,197,  Wills J .
5  Wolverton UDC v. Willis [1962] 1 All ER 243
6  Nagy v. Weston [1965] 1 WLR 280.
7  Redbridge London Borough Council v. Jaques [1970] 1 WLR 1604.
8  Hirst and  Agu  v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr App Rep 143; Waite v. Taylor
(1985) 149 JP 551.
9   Highways Act 1980, s. 329
10  DPP v. Jones  [1999]  2 WLR 625.
3rights.  This approach essentially examines the scope of the "easement" 11
which the public has acquired over the highway.
The fundamental premise of the private law model reminds us that the
ownership of the highway is not vested in the public.   It emphasises that  the
surface of  the highway belongs prima facie to the owner of the land adjoining
it. If the land on either side of the highway is vested in different owners, each is
the owner of the surface as far as the centre of the highway12.  If the highway is
maintained at the public expense, the surface is vested in the highway authority.
The fundamental premise remains, however, that it is still "private" land.
Private law reasoning is paramount in the classical decision of the majority of
the Court in  Harrison v. Duke of Rutland. 13  Here  a highway  ran across a
grousemoor owned by the defendant.  The plaintiff had gone onto the highway
to disrupt the grouse shoot, but was removed from the area by the defendant's
men. He  brought an action for damages for false imprisonment and assault; the
defendant counter-claimed that the plaintiff was a trespasser on the highway.
It was held that the ownership of the sub-soil remained with the defendant even
though a public highway ran over the land. The public highway was merely an
"easement"  or a permission for the public to pass over the land.   Since the
plaintiff had not intended to pass and repass along the highway, his purpose fell
outside that for which the highway was dedicated.  It was thus unlawful and
constituted a trespass.  The issue of motive in establishing lawful user, which
was paramount in Harrison,  is capable of being highly restrictive of potential
lawful user, and  is  considered further below.
The private law model allowed the courts to control highway user at two levels.
First the court might have decided that the activity was not of a permissible
kind.14  Second it examined the purpose or motive with which a prima facie
lawful activity was undertaken.  The result, when these two levels of control,
were applied,  furnished the courts with a weapon to strike down many
common place activities.   For instance, the "purpose" rule  ostensibly outlawed
any kind of commercial use of the highway, even if it did not involve a right to
remain (as in static trading from a stall). Decisions seemed to be  tinctured with
value judgments rather than transparent principles.
                                                          
11  A public right of way is not synonymous with an easement of way because the public right of free
passage may be exercised by anyone, whether he owns land or not. An easement is a right exercisable
over  servient land by the dominant proprietor  by virtue of his estate in the land.  There may, however,
be similarities in the manner of their creation.
12  Surface includes sub-soil for these purposes.
13    [1893] 1 QB 142.
14   E.g., trading from a stationary van: Pitcher v. Lockett [1966] Crim L.R. 283.
4   The Kinds of Lawful User
In  Harrison there was an absence of agreement concerning what activities
were permissible on the highway.    Lord Esher MR was careful to stress that
the public's 'easement' over the highway was not limited to passing and
repassing:
"Highways are, no doubt, dedicated prima facie for the purpose
of passage; but things are done upon them by everybody which
are recognised as being rightly done, and so constituting a
reasonable and usual mode of using a highway as such.  If a
person on a highway does not transgress such reasonable and
usual mode of using it, I do not think that he will be a
trespasser."15
Lord Esher MR's approach was subtly but fundamentally  different from the
orthodox private law view.  This, as it will be recalled,  would have  focused
upon the limited easement which the public acquires over the highway.  His
approach was to abandon private law ideas of limited access and to pursue
instead a communitarian model which was more concerned with whether the
mode of user was a reasonable one.  This was examined according to the public
interest in general and not the exclusive interest of the owner of the sub-soil of
the highway.  This is a fundamentally different approach from the orthodox
analysis. But the majority was more conventional.
 Kay L.J.  stated: 16   
". . . the right of the public upon a highway is that of passing and
repassing over land the soil of which may be owned by a private
person. Using that soil for any other purpose lawful or unlawful is
a trespass."
Lopes L.J.,  also stated the law in narrow private law terms:17
". . . if a person uses the soil of the highway for any purpose other
than that in respect of which the dedication was made and the
easement acquired, he is a trespasser. The easement acquired by
the public is a right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the
purpose of legitimate travel, and the use of the soil for any other
purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, is an infringement of the
rights of the owner of the soil . . . "
                                                          
15   Harrison v. The Duke of Rutland, supra  n. 12 at p. 146-7.
16  at p. 158.
17   at p. 154.
5The majority therefore decided that the public's only legal right  was the right of
passage.   Any other use would be a trespass against the owner of the sub-soil.
18   Nevertheless, Kay L.J., recognised  that the highway is regularly used for
other purposes,19  but he insisted that such uses would be a trespass against the
owner of the sub-soil.  Most instances, would, in his opinion, be too trivial to
justify legal proceedings.20  This appears to acknowledge the social utility of
many activities which do take place upon the highway, but relies on a restrained
invocation of legal redress to shield those activities from incurring a penalty.
Common activities not connected with the right of free passage are therefore an
indulgence of the state, not a fundamental right. This  formulation, which
denies use as of right, therefore accommodates the interest of the zealous
landowner or prosecutor rather than the public.   Those activities which were
socially useful were always vulnerable to removal  from the highway by the
landowner or by public officials.  Community interests in wider recognition of
highway use were accorded no priority under the private law model.
There was also arbitrariness in isolating those uses which were identified as
"trivial" and so deserving of indulgence.  Kay L.J. offered as an  the example
an artist who sets up an easel on the highway.  In contrast,  stallholders or other
traders who occupy a pitch without a licence or consent are often prosecuted.21
Imposed preferences rather than principle appear to distinguish the artist from
the trader. Even if the latter's activities might cause a larger obstruction  it is not
self-evident why each static use should necessarily be treated differently.    
Indeterminacy is the inevitable outcome as prosecutors floundered to identify
uses which, by the operation of some compelling but inadequately described,
public policy on the operation of the private law model, should be indulged
rather than punished.
But this does not conclude the matter, because even if the nature of the activity
fell within the scope of the dedication, that is, it was undertaken in pursuit of
free passage or a right incidental thereto,22  the court would apply a further layer
                                                          
18  E.g., Lopes LJ at p. 154 and Kay LJ at p. 158.
19  At. p 152.
20  The need to indulge trivial uses was re-iterated in A-G v. Wilcox (1938) 36 LGR 593.  Farwell J.
emphasised that anything which obstructs the right of the public to use the whole of the   highway  even
to the smallest possible degree is unlawful but the court will not intervene in trivial cases, such as would
occur if a car let out passengers.  It is noteworthy that setting passengers down is thus of itself unlawful
and does not depend on the reasonableness of the circumstances in which that act takes place.
21 Street trading outside Greater London is often regulated by the so called "street trading code." This is
an adoptive code enacted in  the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, s.3 and Shed.
4  according to which it is an offence inter alia to trade in  streets in which  a licence/consent is
required but where such has not been obtained.   Outside those streets and "prohibited" streets (in which
most forms of street trading are  permitted)  the common law governing highways, usually applies. Bye-
laws sometimes regulate street trading in areas in which the code has not been adopted.
22 Exceptionally, a highway may be dedicated- or may be presumed to have been dedicated- subject to
the rights of street traders.  See further below.
6of control capable of restricting the right still further.  This additional level
examined the purposes for which free passage was undertaken.
Controls on the Purpose of Passage.
The restriction as to purpose is capable of having far-reaching effects for both
political and commercial use of the highway.   For example, even if a person
passes up and down upon the highway - an activity which may appear to be
within the dedication- it does not necessarily follow that his actions are lawful.
It depends upon the purposes for which that person is on the highway.  This is
most clearly seen in Secretary of State for Defence v. Percy.23  In this case bye-
laws affecting an RAF station had been declared ultra vires, but pending an
appeal the Ministry of Defence and local officials declined to remove bye-law
signs from the land.  The defendant removed the signs having gained access to
them by means of  a public footpath.  One question was whether she had
strayed beyond the limits of the path when she removed the signs. Carnwath J.
held, however, that this was unimportant. This was so because this  question
only became relevant if she was using the footpath lawfully.  He decided that
her actions did not fall within the permitted user because she was not using the
footpath for  passing and repassing. Her illegitimate purpose (i.e. her intention
to remove the signs) took her outside the scope of the permitted user of a public
footpath.
This principle has long been recognised.  In R v. Pratt,24   the defendant
trespassed on a public highway when he walked along it  armed with a gun and
accompanied by a dog. The dog was sent  onto private land to send up
pheasants which Pratt then shot. Similarly, in the well known case of Hickman
v. Maisey25  the defendant, a "racing tout",  walked up and down a 15 yard
stretch of the public highway watching horses in training  upon the plaintiff's
land. It was held that he was a trespasser  since his purpose was not to exercise
his right of passage but to act in connection with his business.26
The limitation that the individual using the highway must have done so
intending to exercise the right of free passage is open to criticism. First, it is
uncertain what the inquiry into purpose was designed  to test.  Few ever use the
                                                          
23  [1999] 1 All ER 732.  Limitations as to purpose can also be seen in  Waite v. Taylor (1985) 149 JP
551 in which a juggler performing with lighted fire sticks in a precinct was held to be obstructing the
highway since he was not using the highway for a purpose which was ancillary to his right of free
passage along it.  Even selling refreshments to tired motorists has been held to be an unreasonable use
of the highway:  Waltham Forest LBC v. Mills  [1980] Crim LR 243.
24   (1855) 4 E & B 860.
25   [1900] 1 QB 752.
26  See also Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, above, where it will be recalled that the protester had only
used the highway to disrupt the grouse shoot.
7highway with passing and re-passing as their ultimate purpose. They have other
goals in view because highways provide a means to an end.  This suggests that
the focus on purpose or motive seems to test the end results of the user. This
merely invites value judgments about which goals were socially acceptable. For
example, the racing tout's purpose was held to make his passing and repassing
unlawful. Had he been, for example, a person pacing up and down whilst
waiting for a bus, the activity would have been lawful.27
The limitation as to purpose purports to distinguish those who use the highway
in precisely the same manner, but whose goals are different. This seems
arbitrary.   Could there ever be a consensus about which goals were socially
acceptable?   And why did the law seek to exclude commercial purposes?  If it
was unacceptable for the racing tout to engage in his business on the highway,
could we distinguish the haulage company, or the commercial traveller, the
commuter or indeed anyone who used the highway as a means to an end
connected with profit rather than highway use for its own sake?
The Private Law Model-Concluding Remarks
The first conclusion which may be drawn from the rule that  the highway was
dedicated solely for free passage and activities incidental thereto  is that
stationary forms of  highway use, such as the holding of a meeting or an
assembly28 or stationary forms of street trading prima facie fall outside the uses
for which highways are presumed to be  dedicated.29 This means that any
encroachment onto the highway for an illegitimate purpose is an obstruction
even though members of the public may pass without being impeded.30 This has
the consequence that  those without access to private premises must either
curtail their trading or political  activities, or in respect of the former of these,
have them licensed by the state.31  There is no liberty to trade on the highway,
just as there is no right to hold a political meeting on the highway.32 An
exception for traders  benefits lawful markets  where trading activity can be
organised and governed either by  the state,  or by an beneficiary of a royal
                                                          
27  Presumably incidental to the right of passage, albeit by bus.  A similar conclusion seems possible in
the case of  the stationary pedestrian waiting for a bus.
28   But a more liberal approach to peaceful non-obstructive street protest was taken by the Divisional
Court in Hirst and  Agu  v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr App Rep 143.  The issue
was central to Jones v. DPP (above n. 10) which is  considered below.
29  Wolverton UDC v. Willis [1962] 1 All ER 243; Pitcher v. Lockett [1966] Crim L.R. 283; Waltham
Forest v. Mills [1980] Crim LR 243.
30  E.g. Homer v. Cadman (1886) 16 Cox CC 51; Redbridge LBC v. Jaques [1970] 1 WLR  1604;
Cambridgeshire & Isle of Ely CC v. Rust [1972] 2 QB 426.
31  See above n. 20.
32    Nagy v. Weston (below) purports to make the lawfulness of trading a question of fact which would
permit trading which was reasonable in all the circumstances.  But a close examination of the facts
reveals that the courts have not substantially departed from their stance in Harrison.  The decision is
discussed further below.   See also Cooper v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1986) 82 Crim App
Rep 238.
8franchise of the Crown acting essentially on the state's behalf.33 But this only
re-inforces the principle that the it is state or some nominated and powerful
dignitary or authority which is vested with power either to regulate or to curtail
the trading activity.34
The  private law model is open to further objection because its principles were
founded upon  a legal fiction. This  emphasised property rights as a mechanism
to allow the individual (in this context the landowner) to maximise their own
preferences.  As we have seen the law decided that when the highway was first
laid out the landowner dedicated it for public use for limited purposes. Any use
outside those purposes would be a trespass. This fiction can be exposed for
three reasons.  First,  it is almost certainly inaccurate to assume that most
highways were established by grant.  It is possible that some of oldest highways
originated as hunter's tracks in times of prehistory. Others of great antiquity
may have arisen as convenient trade routes.35  Neither type were "dedicated" to
the public use in the manner and for the purposes  for so long presumed  by the
common law.  Secondly,  in the case of highways which were established by
grant  it is unrealistic to presume that each landowner who made a grant  shared
with all others an identical intention to limit public use. If  each grant was
actually made  subject to its own conditions  it seems that the lawful use of any
highway could differ from that permitted on other highways. Each might be
distinguished according to the terms of the dedication36.  Finally, even if lawful
use can be identified by reference to the actual or presumed intention of the
original landowner  could it be said that this permission, often granted so many
centuries ago, encompassed technological changes in the modes of transport -
from foot and horse  to fast moving vehicular traffic? 37   These considerations
expose the private law model as   the imposed preferences of the common law
disguised as the subjective intention of each grantor.
The Communitarian Approach
                                                          
33  Local authorities have a statutory power under the Food Act 1984, s.50 to establish a market in their
area. Historically markets were most often created by grant under the prerogative to a powerful local
dignitary whose function was essentially to operate the market as a means of preserving public order.
The potentially lucrative right to make charges in respect of goods sold in the market (toll) and to rent
space for stalls (stallage) ensured that the market owner would benefit from fulfilling what was regarded
as a public function. See Hough, The Law of Street Trading,  (Earlsgate Press: 1994).
34  Subject to the rule that every member of the public has the right to come into a lawful market to buy
and to sell: e.g., Scott v. Glasgow Corpn [1988] AC 470.
35  See generally Prof. R. Moore-Colyer, Roads and Trackways of Wales, (Moorland: 1984). Under the
Highways Act 1980, s.31 a way is presumed to have been dedicated as a highway if it has actually been
enjoyed by the public as of right and without interruption for at least twenty years.
36  If successive strips of highway were once vested in different owners and dedicated subject to
different restrictions passage along the entire length of the highway might theoretically  involve both
lawful and unlawful acts.
37  see Lord Irvine of Lairg LC at p. 632.
9The communitarian approach is the antithesis of the private law model.  It
emphasises interdependence and co-operation between individuals and groups.
It resists the traditional  priority of private law rights, and permits any use
which is reasonable, the latter limitation being required to achieve a pragmatic
accommodation of competing interests and uses.
The infiltration of communitarian values in this context is not innovative.  In
Lowdens v. Keaveney38 the court decided that the public's right to use the
highway was not limited to free passage lest anyone  who joined a crowd which
stopped to listen to a military band marching along a street, or the to watch the
funeral of statesman, should be held to have committed an unlawful act. It
resolved the question of lawful user by adopting a communitarian perspective
according to which  only "unreasonable or excessive" use of the highway was
prohibited.39
The essence of a permitted use was that it should merely be reasonable, and this
issue was to be resolved as a question of fact.40   The weakness of the  court's
reasoning  was that it was still value-laden. The deliberate choice of the military
and civic examples (the military band and the statesman's funeral) is revealing
because they are self-consciously laden with a judgment about the perceived
value or importance of the activity.  In an age of Empire the judge must have
chosen these as  exemplars of the kind of  use it was desirable to protect rather
than merely to indulge. It can only be speculated whether street protesters
would have received the same indulgence. This is considered further below.
The  alternative doctrinal foundation from that adopted in Harrison does not
attempt to restrict the type of highway use;  many kinds  of activity could be
lawful. The essence of the communitarian approach is thus to examine the
legality of highway use by reference to the consequences of the use vis a vis the
primary right of free passage.  It precludes the unreasonable domination or
appropriation of a public space by one group to the exclusion of others.  Thus,
for example,  it permits the activities of protesters who do not entirely obstruct
the highway because this is consistent with the free passage of others.41
Nevertheless, the alternative model, whilst apparently more permissive,  still
resounds to policy considerations.
                                                          
38  [1903] 2 IR 142, esp. 146-7. Lowdens v. Keaveney was followed and applied in R v. Clark (No 2)
[1964] 2 QB 315 where it was held that the jury ought to have been directed to ask whether the CND
demonstration was a reasonable use of the highway.
39  per Gibson J. at 89.
40  The occasion duration, place of user and time must be considered along with any wrongful intent.
per Gibson J at p. 90. (Emphasis added).
41    E.g.,  Hirst and  Agu  v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr App Rep 143
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 Nagy v. Weston42 is most revealing in this regard.  As in Lowdens it was
decided that the legality of  highway use had to be considered as a  question of
fact and in particular whether it was reasonable in the circumstances. Relevant
would be the length of time the obstruction continued, the place where it
occurred, the purpose for which it was done, and whether an actual obstruction
to free passage resulted.  The reasoning appears to be coloured by
communitarian concerns emphasising co-operation and balance between
competing interests. However, the italicised words, although ambiguous,
suggest that even the new model could be interpreted so as to control use by
reference  to motive.
It is interesting that in  Nagy the court upheld  the conviction of a hot dog seller
for obstruction since the trading, albeit somewhat brief,  took place beside a
busy highway late at night in a lay-by used by 'buses. This was found to be
unreasonable in all the circumstances.  However, it might be argued  that  no
user  of the carriageway was likely to be substantially impeded by the trading
(which was off the carriageway in a lay-by) the circumstances in which street
trading could be lawful seem somewhat limited. If this trading was
unreasonable, the same could be said of  most forms of street trading.  One
reading of this decisions suggests that the court regarded unlicensed street
trading as an activity undertaken for an impermissible  purpose.
Communitarian reasoning also prevaled in Pugh v. Pigden  & Powley43 which
concerned trading from a  stall at which a queue formed. The stall which was
largely but not entirely situated on private land resulted in  persons standing on
the highway. No obstruction contrary to the Highways Act 1980 s.137 occurred
since there was always room to pass.44  Moreover, the  traders were held to
have a reasonable excuse for inviting the queue to form at their stall.  The court
declined to regulate the activity because the inconvenience caused by the
trading was de minimis and clearly did not demand regulation.  The
consequences  of the activity rather than its relationship with the presumed
origins of the public's right over the highway was accorded  priority.
                                                          
42  [1965] 1 WLR 280.
43  (1987) 151 JP 664.  There is little consistency in the authorities on whether a trader can be made
liable for a queue which forms at his shop door or stall.  Liability was imposed in  Barber v. Penley
[1893] 2 Ch 447 and Lyons, Sons & Co v. Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch 631; but there was no liability for a
queue caused by wartime rationing in Dwyer v. Mansfield [1946] KB 437 because the trader had done
nothing "unnecessary" in the manner of conducting the  business which caused the crowd to gather.
44    The Highways Act 1980, s.137 (as amended) states:  "If a person, without lawful authority or
excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and is
liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale".
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An important decision in which a more liberal approach found favour was
Hirst and Agu v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. 45 Here the Divisional
Court accepted that the highways serve a multiplicity of purposes going beyond
simply providing the means of passing to and fro.  They are part of a social
fabric and due recognition must be given to this.
Thus the court adopted a communitarian stance in its recognition that all
manner of encroachments on the highway may have a social benefit.  The court
emphasised that a balancing exercise is necessary in which the social utility of
the defendant's action (in this case the upholding of the right of free speech) is
weighed against harm caused (encroachment on the highway).46  The need to
safeguard the right of free passage is but one factor in this exercise which of
itself permits all kinds of activities to take place on the highway, if reasonable.
Thus the court resisted inter alia any suggestion that distribution of advertising
material to commuters arriving at stations, or two friends conversing   in the
street should  be criminal activities.  Accordingly, no  offence was committed
by peaceful non-obstructive animal rights protesters who stood outside a shop
which sold furs and offered leaflets to passers-by.
The Private Law Model and Markets on the Highway
The example of market trading on the highway places in a different and
interesting context the arbitrary consequences of the failure to sustain a clear
and satisfactory theoretical foundation for highway use.  The private law model,
entailing a retrospective search for the intention of the grantor,  has been highly
influential, but decisions based upon it lie uncomfortably with others which
accord a higher priority to the contemporary context and the general social
utility of the street market's function.  These latter decisions are, in essence,
founded upon the communitarian model.  The result is an unconvincing and
unappetising bifurcation between  types of market each of which may have
similar  benefits, similar environmental impact  or impact on traffic, and share
the similar antiquity.   It may well be asked why the law, through its inability to
determine the purpose of highways, has haphazardly resolved to treat them
differently.  Before this issue is further examined it is necessary to distinguish
between lawful and informal markets.
Trading in lawful markets does not require the traders therein to obtain a street
trading licence or consent from the local authority.47  It also seems that trading
                                                          
45  (1987) 85 Cr App R. 143.
46  A further difference between the private law and communitarian approaches is that under the former
the social utility of the activity is no defence in an action in private nuisance: Adams v. Ursell [1913] 1
Ch 269.
47  Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, schedule 4, para 1 (2) (b).
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on the highway is not an obstruction of the highway contrary to   the Highways
Act 1980, s.137  because the lawfulness of the market constitutes lawful
authority or excuse for the encroachment on the highway.48 However, a lawful
market is one which is created under statute or charter.49  It is a franchise of
market. This means that those market operators who merely organise a market
(i.e. an informal market) without a "legal pedigree" may be liable for illegal
street trading unless a statutory licence/consent is obtained.50
The absence of market rights, which distinguishes an informal market from a
lawful one, suggests a clear practical distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate markets.  In practice, the issue is far from clear because market
rights (and so lawful markets) can be created by prescription or under the
doctrine of presumed lost grant.  According to these principles the courts can
legitimate a  long established and customary market even though there was no
evidence that the market was actually created by lawful means.  This
demonstrates that some, but not all, informal markets will acquire the clothes of
legality.  In practice it means that markets sharing  similar, informal, origins
can be  treated differently.  The cause of this dichotomy is a doctrinal confusion
similar to that which mystifies and obscures the purposes of highways.
An example of the arbitrary consequences of the law concerns the so called
"hiring,"  "mop" or "statute"  fairs which grew up around the occasions when
magistrates met to fix annual wage rates under the Statute of Labourers 1351.
A large number of these customary fairs survive as amusement fairs, their
original purpose now having been forgotten.   They may, of course, be of
extremely great age, but because they are known not to have been created by
charter they do not acquire market rights.  They are not lawful markets;51
trading therein can be restrained as an obstruction of the highway.  These
markets of great antiquity, which are enjoyed by the public and form part of the
cultural fabric of a locality can enjoy a precarious legal existence, often merely
tolerated by  authority.
However, other market activity which has been continued in a locality for many
years has often won the sympathy of the courts, in part because there may be a
public interest in resisting the withdrawal of  the facility it provides.52 There are
various techniques  upon which the courts may draw should they choose to do
so.  Each betrays the absence of an established theoretical approach.  The first
                                                          
48  See GER v. Goldsmid (1884) 9 App Cas 927 esp. at p. 942 per Ld Selborne LC; A-G v. Horner
(1886) 11 App Cas 66.
49  Manchester City Council v. Walsh (1986) 84 LGR 1.
50  Para. 1 of the street trading code defines street so as to include any place to which the public has
access without payment.  This means that the operation of a market on private land is nonetheless street
trading for which consent must be obtained, unless a charge is made for access to the land in question.
51  Simpson v. Wells (1872) LR 7 QB 214.
52  See Elwood v. Bullock   (1844) 6 QB 383.
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concerns prescription and the second employs the familiar doctrine of limited
dedication of the highway.
(i)  Immemorial User - Actual and Presumed
A grant of franchise of market will be presumed where user has continued since
time immemorial. The limit of legal memory has been established as 1189,
which means that any use which can be established as having continued since
before that date cannot now be challenged.  However, the burden of proving
that a use has continued since before 1189 is a heavy one, so the courts have
allowed a presumption of immemorial user to arise if there has been
uninterrupted modern usage.53  Twenty or more years will suffice to raise this
presumption provided the use is not otherwise explained or contradicted.54
This means that if it is shown that the use originated within legal memory  the
presumption cannot be made.
The doctrine betrays communitarian influences, for it allows the courts to
legitimate  trading which by virtue of its duration could be presumed to serve
the interests of the community.  The operator's lack  of strict legal right to
operate the market (i.e. a charter or a statute)  is ignored for the sake of the
benefit derived from the market.  The effect of this principle is that a market
which has been operated for not less than twenty years will be lawful provided
that no evidence can be adduced that at some time after 1189 the market did not
exist. This is an onerous burden.  The doctrine could not, for example,
legitimate the many former hiring fairs because they are known to have
originated after the Statute of Labourers of 1351.
(ii)   Lost  Modern Grant
This  is an alternative and more beneficial means of legitimating a customary
market.  This is available where the presumption of immemorial user cannot be
made because there is evidence that the market did not or could not exist after
at some date after 1189.55  According to this principle the court will presume
that a grant was made to support the use claimed, but that the grant is now lost.
The doctrine is an "indulgence" which assumes use as of right if twenty years
                                                          
53  Jenkins v. Harvey  (1835) 1 C M   & R 877,894 per Parke B.
54  R v. Joliffe (1823) 2 B & C 54; Darling v. Clue (1864) 4 F & F 329. Market rights are not within the
Prescription Act 1832.  The claim based on prescription failed in Hulbert v. Dale [1909] 2 Ch 570
because the court had evidence that the use was of comparatively recent origin, although it extended
back more than 20 years.  The claim succeeded on the basis of a lost modern grant.
55  E.g.   Hulbert v. Dale [1909] 2 Ch 570.
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uninterrupted usage can be established.56  It appears to promote the private law
technique by presuming that an appropriate  legal pedigree  had been conferred
notwithstanding the absence of evidence to establish this.   Accordingly, the
court may conclude that the inability of the market operator to establish the
lawful creation of the market is not fatal because (it will be presumed) that the
evidence of the grant  has merely been lost or destroyed.    The most important
dimension of this technique is that the court will presume a lost grant even if it
is satisfied no grant was ever made. 57
The case-law reveals how the court disguises communitarian preferences
behind private law rhetoric. This is so because the court ostensibly remains
loyal to the retrospective approach, insisting that there must have been a grant
which once created private rights. The willingness to sustain this conclusion in
the absence of all positive evidence, and possibly in the full knowledge that no
such right had ever actually existed, illustrates the judicial response to
perceived contemporary need regardless of the absence of historical
foundations.  It is an approach which is  ready to accommodate the public
facility provided by the market which is accorded a priority over the other right
of the public to travel along the highway.    The technique is  a legal fiction
justifying the continued operation of  markets of great age for which the long
history of uninterrupted operation itself supplies strong evidence of societal
need.
(iii)  Conditional Dedication of the Highway
The third and final technique is also framed within the private law model.  This
does not invariably result in the preservation of long standing  and beneficial
markets or other customary street trading. The court will ask whether the
highway can be presumed to have been dedicated subject to the rights of traders
to operate on it.  By this means the trading can be permitted where  the traders
are presumed to be the beneficiaries of a legal right to trade.  This technique
was used in Spice v. Peacock58  where the court searched for a dedication of the
highway which would encompass the right to trade on it. The difficulty   was
that the highway was  an immemorial one, but the trading had first occurred
within living memory.  This was fatal to the traders because  it could not be said
that the presumed intention of the landowner who dedicated the highway
embraced the right to trade upon it.
                                                          
56  Penwarden v. Ching (1829) Moo & M 400 at p. 400  Tindall J.  Stronger evidence may be required
to allow the court to arrive at this presumption than is necessary for a claim of prescription at common
law: Tilbury v. Silva (1890) 45 Ch D 98.
57   The issue is not without controversy: see Angus v. Dalton (1877) 3 QBD 85; (1878) 4 QBD 162;
(1881)  6 App Case 740, but does seem now to be settled: Tehidy Minerals Ltd v. Norman [1971] 2 QB
528, 552 where Buckley J. treated the House of Lords in Dalton as having confirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeal on this point.
58  (1875) 39 JP 581.
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The opposite result obtained in  Jones v. Matthews59 where a highway had been
laid out in the previous thirty years.  There was no direct evidence as to the
scope of the dedication, but the court held that it could be presumed that it was
intended to preserve trading on the highway that had been conducted during at
least the previous forty years.  The prior right to trade thus entitled the traders
to continue their activities on the highway.60  The decision is interesting
because there was actually no evidence that the highway was actually laid out
with express reservations for the rights of traders. The only evidence was that
trading on the site pre-existed the modern highway, and that was held to be
sufficient. Similarly in A-G v. Horner61  the expansion of a market into
neighbouring streets was not unlawful because it was found that the streets
were laid out after  the market had been established and so the court was
prepared to presume that the highway had been dedicated subject to the right of
the market operator to allow stallholders to trade upon the highway.
In two further examples  the court's decision is not explained by the private law
reasoning upon which the court claimed to draw.  These represent a more or
less open acknowledgement of a communitarian model. One such decision was
Le Neve  v. The Vestry of Mile End Old Town62   where for many years the
occupiers of certain properties, in connection with their trades, had placed
obstructions-such as horse troughs or carriages for repair - on land between the
footway and the carriageway to which the public had access as of right  The
tradesman paid rent to the lord of the manor for the use of this strip of land.  A
statutory authority,  in purported exercise of statutory powers,   removed the
obstructions , but was held to have acted ultra vires in doing so.    The court
held that  the traders occupied the land with the permission of the lord of the
manor and that, when the public acquired the right to pass over the strip their
right must be presumed to have been  subject to  the rights of the traders.
The important feature of this reasoning was that there was no positive evidence
of a conditional dedication of the highway.   Notwithstanding the ostensible
acceptance of the private law framework the court was transparently
unconcerned with  the true origins of the public's right over the land in
question.   The essential issue must have been the court's sub silentio
recognition that the trading was beneficial and reasonable. There was no public
interest in regulating the trader's activities because  the public suffered almost
no inconvenience since it had unimpeded use of the footway and carriageway
and only used the strip of and to pass between the two.  This must have entailed
some implicit balancing exercise in which the court found that the trading did
not unreasonably interfere with the public's right of free passage.
                                                          
59  (1885) 1 TLR 482.
60  See also A-G v. Horner (1886) 11 App Cas 66 discussed below.
61  Id.
62  (1858) 8 E & B 1054.
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Elwood v. Bullock63 is to similar effect.  Here, in accordance with an ancient
custom, licensed victuallers placed "booths"  on a highway during a fair.
Although there was absolutely no evidence that the highway had been laid out
after the creation of the fair, the court was willing to presume a conditional
dedication of the highway so that the right of public passage was subject to the
rights of the licensed victuallers.
These latter decisions illustrate how the courts will stretch established principle
in order to achieve  results which accommodate the needs of the contemporary
community rather than the presumed preferences of a private landowner.   Lord
Denman CJ in Elwood admitted that the decision in Elwood was founded on
issues of public policy when he stated that the public's  right of passage was not
more important nor beneficial than the right of the licensed victuallers (from
which the public also derived a benefit). In other words,  the decision was
essentially founded on the balancing exercise  in which  the court favoured the
use  which it perceived as of equivalent social benefit to the prima facie right of
the public to be able to pass and repass over the entirety of the highway.
The reality is that this approach actually ignores both the history of the site and
the origin of the market (hence the willingness of the court to presume an origin
in the absence of any evidence whatsoever) and instead focuses on the question
of the importance of the market judged against competing contemporary uses.
This is essentially an application of communitarianism since the court is
examining whether the benefit of the market to the public can be reconciled
with the public's right of free passage.   Since no individual can show a positive
right to conduct the market, the  issue is essentially whether its continued
operation is in the public interest.
 The Private Law Model and Markets on the Highway: Concluding
Remarks.
In conclusion, the doctrinal confusion produces somewhat arbitrary results.
The private law model precludes hiring fairs from acquiring prescriptive,
customary rights. This is not so with other long standing customary markets and
fairs. It is also evident that the courts policy of attempting to preserve
customary highway uses is not convincingly undertaken within the private law
model. The fictions of the doctrine of lost modern grant, as well as those
concerned in presuming a conditional dedication of the highway  demonstrate
how the courts are uninhibited in pursuing  a communitarian approach which
brings within focus all relevant circumstances (the benefit of the market, the
environmental impact, consequence for highway users etc.) rather than a
monocentric examination simply of the presumed choices of a  private
landowner made long ago.
                                                          
63  (1844) 6 QB 383.
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This leads us to the practical objection to the private law approach is that its
focus is historical.    If a private right to trade can be identified or presumed, the
trading takes place as of right, regardless of whether it is appropriate to modern
conditions.   There is no concern with contemporary circumstances which
might require a different regulatory approach to be applied.   The highway may
have become incorporated into a busy commercial district causing much
inconvenience to traffic.    But the private law approach treats the continued
trading as a vested private legal right which prevails over the public right of
free passage.   This  creates an ideological  tension, with more modern and
utilitarian regimes, such as planning law,  for controlling the use of land.64  This
would be less likely  occur under  the communitarian model,  since as a
balancing exercise the needs of the travelling public could be accorded  weight
appropriate to the altered environment.
DPP v Jones : A Revised Theoretical Model?
In  DPP v. Jones the House of Lords had to determine whether a demonstration
of about twenty individuals on a roadside verge in the vicinity of Stonehenge
constituted a  trespassory assembly.65    This issue itself posed the very question
with which we are presently concerned: what is the right of the public in respect
of the highway?   This could not be satisfactorily resolved without determining
the appropriate theoretical model governing highway use.
By a majority of  3-2 their lordships decided that, depending on the facts,  a
peaceful and non-obstructive public assembly on a highway can constitute a
reasonable user of the highway such that it is not a trespass.  However, their
lordships reasoning betrayed considerable divergence indicating a continued
and regrettable absence of agreement  about the principles governing highway
use.
 Private Law v. Communitarianism in DPP v. Jones
Of their lordships only Lord Irvine was prepared to reject unequivocally the
private law model.  He reasoned that restricting the use of the highway to the
use actually contemplated by the landowner would be a legal fiction, since the
                                                          
64  Spook Erection v Secretary of State [1988] 2 All ER 667; see also s.31 of the  Highways Act 1980
which removes a private legal right to trade on the highway under certain circumstances:  see
Gloucestershire CC  v  Farrow [1985] 1 WLR 741.
65    An order under s 14A (1) of the Public Order Act 1986 was in force prohibiting  trespassory
assemblies.
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public's right of access would necessarily differ from highway to highway.
Since the court was never asked to enforce the actual intention of the
landowner the rationale of adhering to this legal fiction was lost.   He thus
concluded with a resounding rejection of private law principles:
"the public highway is a public place which the public may enjoy
for any reasonable purpose, provided that the activity in question
does not amount to a public or private nuisance and does not
obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary right
of the public to pass and repass: within these qualifications there
is a public right of peaceful assembly on the highway." 66   
It followed that there was no longer a need merely to indulge the many common
place activities which highways are properly used. Their exercise should be a
matter of right not toleration.  If it were otherwise, and a peaceful assembly on
the highway were necessarily a trespass, the right under Article 11 of the
European Convention of Human Rights would be denied. However, he
acknowledged that this right was not absolute.  English statutory restrictions to
prevent wilful obstruction of the highway were held to be  consistent with
Article 11.  However, his lordship found that the common law  recognised the
right of peaceful non-obstructive assembly without recourse to the European
Convention.
Lord Clyde's, who also referred en passant to Article 11,  pursued reasoning
which sought to obscure the contradiction  between the communitarian and
private law models in order to mediate between them.  He adopted the private
law premise that the highway is dedicated for limited purposes, but then
construed the presumed dedication in liberal terms. In citing Hickman v. Maisey
his starting point was that the primary right of the public is the right of free
passage, but subsidiary rights  can be framed in wide terms.  He considered that
:
If a group of people stand in the street to sing hymns or Christmas
carols they are in my view using the street within the legitimate
scope of the public right of access to it, provided of course that
they do so for a reasonable period and without any unreasonable
obstruction to traffic. If there are shops in the street and people
gather to stand and view a shop window, or form a queue to enter
the shop, that is within the normal and reasonable use which is
matter of public right.....All such activities seem to me to be
subsidiary to the use for passage. So I have no difficulty in
holding that in principle a gathering of people at the side of a
                                                          
66  per Lord Irvine of Lairg LC at pp. 632-633.
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highway within the limits of the restraints which I have noted
may be within the scope of the public's right of access to the
highway. 67  (Emphasis supplied)
This reasoning seems to be an   intuitive attempt to sustain desired  ad hoc
social arrangements. However, the activities described  as ancillary to the right
of passage (e.g. singing carols) do not convince.  The reasoning barely
disguises an unacknowledged reliance on communitarian principles to save
activities identified as deserving the protection of the law.  His lordship,
however, shrank from pursuing this reasoning as far as Lord Irvine because he
ultimately rejected the latter's conclusion that any reasonable, peaceful and non-
obstructive  use of the highway would be non-trespassory.  He thought this
would permit an "ill-defined" area of uses capable of eroding the pre-eminence
of the right of free passage.68
The lack of resolve in identifying a clear theoretical foundation leaves the
citizen somewhat confused. For example, reconciling his lordship's
unwillingness to legitimate any reasonable use with the acceptance of not only
of hymn singing but also the type of non-obstructive assembly at issue in this
appeal, is not straightforward.69  His lordship escaped this dilemma  by
determining that this is merely a question of  fact and degree for the trial court.
This is of no assistance to those who wish to know the law before undertaking a
particular static use of the highway.  Would a commonplace activity such as
street trading, if undertaken reasonably, be lawful? Lord Clyde's resort to the
discredited limitation as to purpose further compounds the problem of
indeterminacy:
If the purpose of the activity becomes the predominant purpose of
the occupation of the highway, or if the occupation becomes more
than reasonably transitional in terms of either time or space, then
it may come to exceed the right to use the highway. 70
 Lord Hutton considered that the principles governing the public's right of
access to the highway  should be extended.  It should include the right to
conduct a peaceful non-obstructive assembly in a reasonable manner.
Predominantly his reasoning is framed so as to legitimate uses connected with
freedom of expression.  However, there are indications that, like Lord Irvine, he
may have been prepared to go further, for he indicated that precedent  is "open
to a broader construction and that (the authorities) do not exclude a reasonable
use of the highway beyond passing and repassing, provided always that the use
                                                          
67  at pp. 654-655.
68  at p. 655.
69  Lord Hutton at p. 664 expressly rejected the suggestion that an assembly could be an activity
incidental to free passage.
70 at p. 655.
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is not inconsistent with the paramount purpose of a highway, which is for the
use of the public to pass and repass." 71 (emphasis supplied). A reasonable
activity might become unreasonable  by reason of the space occupied or the
duration of time for which it goes on. 72  On balance this appears to locate his
reasoning with the communitarian tradition, albeit in a rather circumscribed
version.
The dissenting judges were not prepared to dismantle the  private law model  to
vindicate communitarian concerns with reasonable access to the highway.
They were concerned that any extension of the public's right of access beyond
the primary right of free passage and the limited range of ancillary uses would
embrace a right to remain on land to the detriment of private landowners.  Lord
Slynn's views were typical73
The appellants' argument in effect involves giving to members of
the public the right to wander over or to stay on land for such a
period and in such numbers as they choose so long as they are
peaceable, not obstructive, and not committing a nuisance. It is a
contention which goes far beyond anything which can be
described as incidental or ancillary to the use of a highway as
such for the purposes of passage; nor does such an extensive use
in my view constitute a reasonable, normal or usual use of the
highway as a highway. If the appellants' claim is right, it seems to
me to follow that other uses of the highway than assembly would
be permitted - squatting, putting up a tent, selling and buying
food or drinks - so long as they did not amount to an obstruction
or a nuisance.
Lords Slynn and Hope were not satisfied that the European Convention on
Human rights required any change to this statement of the law since the it
permitted exceptions to the right of assembly which were  necessary for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others consistent with those imposed
under English law.  Lord Hope was also influenced by Article 1 of the First
Protocol which guarantees that every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and that no one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law.  He concluded that landowners might be deprived of this right if
trespassers were permitted by law to remain on land.
The dissentients thus concluded that the public's right was limited to passing
and repassing along the highway and activities incidental thereto.  In substance
                                                          
71 at  p. 665.
72 at p. 666.
73 at p. 639.
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this amounts to a continued vindication of the private law model of highway
use.
Conclusion
The law governing highway use has long been obfuscated by the court's
resistance to principles which could recognise  as lawful  many valued and
important social, political and economic activities that take place de facto on
public highways. The law has declined to acknowledge that highways are a
public resource even though most are maintained at public expense. The
dominance of the private law model means that much activity  is tolerated
rather than permitted as of right.  But the interpretation and application of this
model has neither  been satisfactory  nor clear; neither has it been consistently
followed.  The result has been an unsatisfactory indeterminacy of principle and
of outcome.
It is clear that the courts have ventured further with the communitarian model
in the market context than in the context of free speech and  other political
activity on the highway. This has permitted the court to balance the interests of
the public in continuing a market against the claim of the right of free passage
to be the exclusive legitimate use of the highway. This polycentric exercise
seems capable of producing outcomes which are more satisfactory since it does
not fossilise modern highway uses according to the contemporary preferences
of a private landowner. The court may, for example, take into account the
importance of the use, the nature and importance of the highway and other
competing uses.
Although the communitarian model has not been consistently applied in
relation to markets,  it does seem more deeply embedded in the market as
opposed to the political context.  Similarly  decisions on unorganised street
trading (i.e. that outside markets) seem predominantly rooted in private law
influences despite lip-service to communitarian model in cases such as Nagy v.
Weston.  In practice there seems little commitment  to legitimating street selling
where a trader lacks a licence or consent.74   This  suggests that the adoption of
a communitarian  model, which is dominant in the market context,   is not the
radical departure that the minority speeches in DPP v. Jones  might have
suggested.  It is, however, selectively applied.
The inability to resolve fundamental questions of principle has meant that even
the  basic right of  peaceful non-obstructive protest has been  greeted in the
House of Lords with judicial uncertainty and dissent.  Even the majority
                                                          
74  The argument may be advanced that this is to compel traders to submit to the regulation (and costs)
of the licensing system.  However, it must not be forgotten that not all street are "designated" under the
1982 Act.  This  means the licensing scheme was not intended by Parliament to apply to all public
highways even  in areas in which it was adopted.
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judgements in Jones are tentative in their recognition of this right and appear
only extend to a principle that a static demonstration might not be trespassory,
depending on the facts.   Of the  three  judges who  concur in the result in Jones
only Lord Irvine seems unequivocally to embrace communitarian principles,
although it is arguably possible to identify communitarian tendencies in the
treatment of the private law model by Lords Clyde and Hutton. The real
significance of the decision may, however,  be that in the context of political
uses of the highway the long shadow of the private law model  will continue to
furnish the courts with the potential means to curb all manner of peaceful
protest on the familiar grounds that its presence on the highway may have
impeded free passage.
In conclusion, DPP v. Jones may have decided that a non-obstructive peaceful
assembly is not necessarily trespassory (although it may be) but it has
conspicuously failed to resolve the issue of principle as to what activities are
permitted on the highway.  This failure stems from the resistance to embracing
a communitarian model, because fundamentally, highways remain private
property on which the public have but a conditional and circumscribed
freedom.
